The News is…

Article By Don Sutherland

With more than a dozen political leaders having either established exploratory committees or declared their intention to seek the U.S. Presidency in 2008, it is not too soon to consider some of the qualities the next President should possess. Considering the eroding American geopolitical standing and major international challenges confronting the nation, the next President will likely need to possess extensive knowledge of foreign affairs. Election of a candidate with little or no meaningful foreign policy knowledge would be a risky proposition.

The next President will likely need to resolve or make significant progress in a number of major foreign affairs matters. These issues include:

∙ The ideological struggle with Islamist extremists: Ultimate success in this long-duration ideological struggle will likely rest on the development of a strategy that would bring together the United States, its allies, and moderate Muslim states. Unless the world’s Muslim community is given an incentive and means to isolate the extremists who lead the terrorist effort, progress will likely remain far more limited. Implementation of such a strategy will likely require frequent personal diplomacy by the President among the world’s major moderate Muslim states and a willingness to engage diplomatically hostile states such as Iran and Syria. The burden of refusing to work toward building a better relationship between the world’s Islamic states and the West should rest with the rejectionist states. Continuation of the present policy of refusing to pursue diplomacy to its fullest extent spreads the blame to all the parties who refuse to collaborate on such an important cause.

∙ Stabilizing Iraq or limiting the fall-out from a fragmented/failing state: The proposed “surge” strategy faces numerous substantial barriers that could preclude success. It provides too little manpower for a purely military solution, it places heavy reliance on an overly-sectarian and less-than-competent Iraqi transitional government to pull the country together, it does little to address Sunni political and economic disenfranchisement, and it is at the mercy of violent sectarian militias and outside states whose interests are not aligned with achieving a stable multi-ethnic/multi-religious Iraq. If the U.S. strategy is continuing to fail, the United States will need to limit its geopolitical losses and rebuild its regional credibility. It will also need to promote stability in moderate states such as Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia and provide protection from possible Iranian domination. In short, if a bad outcome is realized in Iraq, the next President will need to know from the onset how he or she will address it.

∙ Iran’s quest for regional hegemony: Iran’s nuclear program, military modernization, active role in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, and increasingly active diplomacy outside the Middle East gives every indication that Iran is seeking regional dominance. By the time the next President takes office, the difficulty in overcoming this rising challenge will likely have been exacerbated on account of the current U.S. refusal to directly engage Iran, along with clumsy efforts that do little to accommodate Russia’s and China’s critical interests even as the U.S. seeks their cooperation with regard to Iran’s nuclear program. In an environment in which direct diplomacy is non-existent and the major interests of key players are ignored, little progress can be expected. Interests, not unabashed idealism, set the framework for foreign policy. The next President will need to reverse the current diplomatic stance, develop an approach founded on common goals that safeguard or enhance the critical interests of all the players, and aggressively reach out to moderates within Iran’s political, academic and economic communities to promote gradual but unmistakable change. At the same time, the U.S. will need to demonstrate through words and actions that it will not sacrifice the wellbeing of its key regional allies, Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.

∙ China’s rising military power: China is a rising economic, political, and military power. Already, its economy is the world’s second largest. As it continues to grow, it has embarked on a vigorous campaign not only to modernize its military, but also to push the frontiers of technology. Toward that end, it is working to establish leadership in Space. At present, it is expanding both its civil and military capabilities in Space. How China continues to evolve will be of global importance. China’s recent destruction of one of its aging weather satellites offers the possibility of a new military rivalry. If China is able to gain a major capacity to control or dominate Space, on-the-ground advantages currently possessed by the U.S. Military would be rendered obsolete or useless. The present decisive U.S. advantage from smart weapons, communications capabilities, and other information-based capacities would cease to be relevant. That could make it far more difficult and costly for the U.S. to safeguard its critical interests. The next President will need to engage in regular, robust and personal diplomacy at the “President-to-President” level with China and initiate a strong U.S. research effort to assure that the United States would not lose its advantages in Space. The possibility of holding regular summits along the lines of those undertaken during the Cold War with the Soviet Union may also be necessary to manage this issue. Given China’s need for internal stability and sustained economic growth, the U.S. is in a good position to bring about a diplomatic agreement that ultimately precludes a Space-based arms race and strengthens the larger bilateral partnership between the two countries.

∙ Rebuilding the U.S.-Russia relationship: Russia has been engaged in a policy of counterbalancing the United States. Such a stance raises the costs to secure and promote U.S. interests abroad. The weak United Nations Security Resolutions concerning Iran’s nuclear program and limited Russian assistance regarding North Korea’s nuclear weapons program are just a few of the consequences. With Russia becoming increasingly assertive in its “Near Abroad” and its oil resources giving it greater leverage on the world stage, a policy that distances Russia from the U.S. is counterproductive. The next President will need to offer Russia whole-hearted support in its own struggle with radical Islamist extremists, full partnership in NATO, and initiate discussions over a free trade agreement that would bring Russia closer to the U.S. and West.

∙ Reinvigorating trans-Atlantic relations: The trans-Atlantic relationship is among the most important U.S. relationships. The fundamental disagreements over the Iraq War have weakened this relationship. Those disagreements have not broken it, as the shared interests between the United States and its European allies are too great to bring about such an outcome at this time. Still, this relationship will need to be re-strengthened if the U.S. is to maximize its global leverage. This would entail more of a partnership than has existed in recent years. A partnership, of course, does not preclude U.S. freedom to act when critical interests are at stake. It does mean more collaboration and greater willingness to listen to other viewpoints. Indeed, hindsight is golden, but had the U.S. perhaps waited a little longer, the reality of no WMD in Iraq might have been established. More importantly, the extra time might have allowed for the development of an effective post-war strategy that could have resulted in a very different situation in Iraq than what exists today.

∙ Re-engage Latin America: The next President will need to visit the region and personally re-engage the major players including Brazil and Argentina in order to minimize the slow fracturing of the Continent in which several states are drifting toward a Venezuela-Cuba anti-United States./anti-free market orbit. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited the region just recently. The U.S. President should be doing so on a regular basis. However, U.S. policy has amounted to little more than neglect. Such an approach undermines U.S. interests in the region. The increasingly assertive anti-U.S. policies being undertaken and expanded in parts of Latin America are, in part, more appealing and more readily-advanced on account of continuing American neglect.

When it comes to the campaign process, the news media should vigorously probe the candidates’ understanding of foreign policy. The Media should thoroughly test their assumptions, understanding, and calculations. For example, during the debates, the candidates should be asked questions along the lines of what in a country’s history, political or economic framework, or culture gives them confidence that a proposed approach might work. The questions should not be provided in advance to the candidates. Otherwise, it would difficult to determine whether the candidates have merely crammed for the debates or are truly prepared to lead. The next President needs to be truly prepared to lead, especially when it comes to foreign policy.

Don Sutherland has researched and written on a wide range of geopolitical issues.

Article by Don Sutherland

In his timeless classic, The Art of War, Sun Tzu observed, “The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation at all! It is by attention to this point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose.” Today, that lesson is as relevant as it was some 2,500 years ago. A lack of strategic planning and analysis is hazardous to the wellbeing of any public- and private-sector organization. Recent years have demonstrated just how devastating such short-sightedness can be. In such cases, even as the world around them changed, political and business leaders slept on until the policy failure or organizational crisis finally awakened them. Compounding the tragedy was the reality that many of these “surprises” were all too predictable.

President Bush’s decision to go to war in Iraq generated much controversy. However, it was the Administration’s startling failure to develop a strategic post-war plan that led to the present situation in which Iraq is fragmenting despite nearly $400 billion in expenditures to date.

In February 2003, when it came to budgeting, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz’s told the Congress, “Fundamentally, we have no idea what is needed unless and until we get there on the ground.” In terms of the risk of ethnic conflict, Wolfowitz stated, “We have no idea what kind of ethnic strife might appear in the future, although as I have noted, it has not been the history of Iraq’s past.” With respect to military manpower, Wolfowitz ridiculed General Eric Shinseki’s estimate of “several hundred thousand” troops as “wildly off the mark.”

The evolution of events in Iraq highlighted the catastrophic costs of pursuing any major campaign in a blind fashion. Iraq’s post-war future was readily foreseeable had one only taken the time to examine that country’s history. Throughout the 300-year Ottoman rule, Iraq’s Shia and Sunni communities struggled for dominance. In 1999, a military planning exercise that simulated an invasion of Iraq warned, “Iraq in Saddam’s wake is likely to be unstable and this instability may spread if not properly managed. For example, Iraq’s neighbors may seek to take advantage of this period of uncertainty. Or, the country could fragment along religious and/or ethnic lines. Or, internal forces could create domestic and regional chaos as they bid for power.” In 1995, Colin Powell wrote of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, “I am certain that had we taken all of Iraq, we would have been like the dinosaur in the tar pit…”

No meaningful strategic planning and analysis was conducted. Instead, the campaign was hastily launched in the absence of a sufficient understanding of what lay ahead. As a result, the United States and its allies found themselves in the “tar pit” about which Powell wrote.

The President’s newly unveiled strategy still fails to reflect the kind of strategic understanding that is critical to success in a complex and challenging geopolitical environment. It remains badly flawed. It fails to provide sufficient military power for a purely military solution, places all of its bets on a sectarian government’s radically changing character into a government of national reconciliation, and avoids diplomatic engagement with some of the region’s major powers.  Consequently, former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski complained of the revised approach, “The U.S. refusal to explore the possibility of talks with Iran and Syria is a policy of self-ostracism that fits well into the administration’s diplomatic style of relying on sloganeering as a substitute for strategizing.”

The increasing dearth of strategic depth in American foreign policy has not gone unnoticed abroad. Shirin Ebadi, winner of the 2003 Nobel Peace Prize, exclaimed, “It amazes me that the U.S., with all its scientific accomplishments, is so shortsighted in its foreign policy.”

The private sector has not proved immune to similarly woeful efforts. As a consequence, companies and even industries have paid a terrible price in terms of finances, lost market share, and damaged competitiveness.

In the years leading up to the September 2001 terrorist attacks, major U.S. airlines had become so accustomed to an increasingly favorable operating environment that they lost focus on their cost structure. This negligence increased their vulnerability to the normally-recurring dips in the business cycle and rendered them almost completely unprepared for larger shocks for which they had not planned.

In 1990, the U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics’ (BTS) Transportation Services Index (TSI) for passengers averaged 83.4 In such an environment, the major airlines (those having annual revenue of $20 million or more) suffered a cumulative operating loss of $1.9 billion. Through the rest of the 1990s, passenger travel rose sharply. In 1995, the index reached 94.9. By 2000 it averaged 118.5. In response, operating profits rose though not as rapidly as the TSI passenger index, and that offered a hint of a weakening cost structure. In 1995, cumulative operating profits came to $5.9 billion. Five years later, they had increased to $7.0 billion. As the airlines’ cost competitiveness eroded, the level of passenger traffic that once generated operating profits would soon inflict devastating financial losses.
In 2001, a mild recession developed. The increase in the TSI passenger index slowed, with it averaging 119.2 during the January-June period in 2001 as opposed to 117.1 for the same period a year earlier. Operating profits turned to operating losses. During the first six months of the year, the major airlines experienced a cumulative operating loss of $1.5 billion. Their loss of competitiveness had begun to take a toll.

Then, on September 11, 2001, the Al Qaeda terrorist group carried out suicide attacks that involved crashing hijacked airplanes into the twin towers of New York City’s World Trade Center and the Pentagon in Washington, DC. A fourth plane crashed in Pennsylvania as passengers battled to gain control of the plane. For 2001, the TSI passenger gauge averaged 113.5. In September 2001, it reached a low of 94.6. The major airlines, once able to operate profitably at that level of traffic, experienced a cumulative operating loss of $10.3 billion for the year. In 2002, the TSI averaged 111.6, and their cumulative operating loss amounted to $8.6 billion. In 2003, the index rose slightly to 112.7 and they suffered an additional cumulative operating loss of $2.1 billion.

In the wake of the attacks, the airlines were staggered by a situation for which their senior managers never planned. Although one could not have foreseen the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the specific fashion in which they were carried out, the idea of suicide terrorist attacks that employed planes was foreseeable. A 1999 report published by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress warned, “Suicide bomber(s) belonging to Al Qaeda’s Martyrdom Battalion could crash-land an aircraft packed with high explosives (C-4 and semtex) into the Pentagon, the headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), or the White House.” The report also stated that Al Qaeda could bomb “one or more U.S. airliners with time-bombs.” The major airlines’ 10K filings make no mention of such a risk, much less the existence of contingency plans for such a scenario. The combination of eroding competitiveness and a lack of strategic planning contributed to catastrophic financial losses for the U.S. airline industry.

“Flying blind” is extremely reckless. The two cases shatter prevailing myths that underpin what is essentially a paradigm of short-sightedness: That in the fast-paced 21st century, there is not enough time for organizations to focus on long-range planning; that in the face of fierce competition, scarce resources are better used elsewhere; and that uncertainty makes the future largely unpredictable. In reality, these myths only promote a “fly-blind” approach to government or business. More often than not, a spectacular but avoidable crash lies ahead. The consequences of such failures are far worse than the investment in time and resources required to avoid or mitigate them.

The federal government with its arrayed international interests and every organization that operates in the world marketplace, faces competition from abroad, seeks to go global, or relies on the global supply chain, needs to have a senior leader or unit that provides it with timely and credible “Intelligence” on the environment in which it functions. Every government entity or company needs to be familiar with the major scenarios that could significantly impact its policy outcomes or operations. Contingency plans—what steps will be taken, who will be responsible, how will the message be communicated, what resources will be needed, etc.—need to be in place before the crisis hits. That expectation is not unreasonable. The absence of such planning, even if it initially hastens decision making, can be extremely hazardous.

In contrast a credible commitment to strategic planning and analysis can yield huge dividends. It can allow senior decision makers to identify major geopolitical and market risks and emerging opportunities that could allow a nation to safeguard or enhance its critical interests or a company to protect or augment its core business and profitability.

Don Sutherland has researched and written on a wide range of geopolitical issues.

 

By Zachary Scott

The iPod’s battery is a fragile little piece of equipment it seems. If you want your iPod’s battery to last longer and live longer, here is a couple of tips. Some will probably seem pretty evident. But just because they are, doesn’t me they aren’t useful.

First of all. It is important to keep the battery at room temperature. Too hot or too cold will brim it’s optimum performance, which according to Apple’s docs is around 20 degrees Celsius. Wait until the iPod is at this temperature before using it.

There is a great functionality on the iPod that will also help with it’s battery. The hold mechanism. Why you ask? Well, when you aren’t using your iPod, and have it in your pocket, you might accidentally press the play button or any other, hence starting a tune up and devouring some battery livelihood. So when you aren’t using your iPod, put that sucker on hold!

You should also charge your iPod once it is flat. This will ensure a better and longer life for your iPod. Remember that it uses some batteries even in sleep mode, so when you aren’t using it, it is possible the battery will go flat. In any case, wait until this happens before charging.

When you don’t use your iPod, put it in sleep mode. To do this, press the play button for a couple of seconds, it will look like it is turned off. Also use the pause button as much as possible when listening to music, but need to stop listening for some reason or another. The pause button will evidently stop the useless playing and there for the useless use of batteries.

The backlighting option. I personally don’t use the backlighting, unless it is truly necessary like at night. I just flip the option on at that moment. The rest of the time, is is off. Lights use batteries so they will last less time if the backlight option is on. The same thing can apply for the equalizer. I don’t use this option, as I am not a professional of sound, I can’t even tell the difference with it on or off. It being off, will use much less battery life.

Changing tracks with the previous and next buttons, can also make your battery life shorter. This is because every time the iPod changes tracks, it must open the hard drive, which uses battery life evidently.

All in all, these are the tips I have received and tested that seem to keep my iPod on for much longer.

Enjoy and have fun!

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